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tion. In that case, the court interpreted the failure to pay
materialmen or subcontractors as a default by the con-
tractor under the primary contract. Some courts78 have
gone so far as to infer such a condition in a construction
contract where subcontractors remain unpaid. Rather than
relying on the possible implied terms, the owner can insert
in the construction contract a condition precedent clause
which clearly states that failure of the contractor to pay
his laborers, materialmen and subcontractors shall be a
breach of the main contract.74  With such a clause in the
contract, the Government's tax lien would be inferior to the
owner's right to pay the retained funds to discharge any
mechanic's lien. 5
AMORTIZATION OF NON-CONFORMING USES
By ALLAN T. FELL
I. LEGAL CoNSIDmERATION
The power of a municipality to pass reasonable zoning
ordinances was firmly established in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,' which settled the controversy over
prospective regulation of undeveloped land but left unre-
solved the problem of how to deal with previously exist-
ing non-conforming uses, which were believed to be entitled
to constitutional protection.2
where the author criticizes the Fourth Circuit for deciding Durham on the
peculiar lien provisions instead of taking the approach of New York
Housing, which was also open to it under the construction contract.7 3 Capital Fire & Casualty Co. v. City of Birmingham, 10 Am. Fed. Tax
R. 2d 5967 (1962) ; F. H. McGraw & Co. v. Sherman Plastering Co., 60 F.
Supp. 504, 512 (D. Conn. 1943).
7' The American Institute of Architects is the leading authority which
promulgates standard contract forms in the construction industry. PaKER
& ADAMS, THE AIA STANDARD CONTRACT FORMS AND T-m LAW (1954). See
Art. 9, at p. 30 and Art. 32, at p. 50, for the language used in the standard
contract relevant to the right of mechanics to be paid as against a federal
tax lien.
75 Although the owner is protected, unless a mechanic's lien is perfected
or the contract or state law requires the owner to pay the materialmen and
subcontractors from the retained funds, the tax lien may still prevail.
Compare two recent cases, Fine Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 328 F. 2d
419, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Youngstown S. & T. Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-
Comstock of Ind., 227 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
1272 U.S. 365 (1926). For an excellent discussion of this case see Reno,
Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the Floating Zone, 23 MD. L. REv. 105
(1963). See also Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. REv. 121 (1963).
2Board of Zoning Appeals of Howard County v. Meyer, 207 Md. 389,
114 A. 2d 626 (1955) ; Higgins v. City of Baltimore, 206 Md. 89, 110 A. 2d
503 (1955).
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Non-conforming uses are common to all zoning statutes
or ordinances "and are those permitted by such statutes or
ordinances to continue even though similar uses are not
permitted in the area in which they are located.' 3 To
qualify as a non-conforming use, a use must be in existence
at the time of the enactment of the zoning ordinances or
at the date the ordinance becomes effective.4
Generally, prior non-conforming uses have been allowed
to continue because it has been felt that zoning laws could
not constitutionally be applied retroactively to deprive the
owner of his non-conforming use. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland accordingly has held that a lawful pre-existing
use of property confers a vested right which cannot be
destroyed by the subsequent enactment of zoning regula-
tion.5 The court has also held that the zoning of an area
by a county as residential cannot apply to a previously
established commercial use which is entitled under the cir-
cumstances to constitutional protection.'
"Non-conforming uses are usually continued with the
expectation that they will eventually disappear" through
abandonment, destruction and other normal changes. 7 Non-
conforming uses, however, still abound, with the result that
3 Beyer v. City of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444, 446, 34 A. 2d 765 (1943).
4 See Boulevard Scrap v. Baltimore, 213 Md. 6, 130 A. 2d 743 (1957)
Daniels v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 205 Md. 36, 106 A. 2d 57 (1954).
5 Amereihin v. Kotras, 194 Md. 591, 601, 71 A. 2d 865 (1950). At page 600
the court said:
"It is well established law that if a person, prior to the time zoning
regulations are effective, commences to build on his property a building
for ithe purpose of conducting light manufacturing (as in this case)
and expends money in the erection of such a building, or in partially
erecting such a building, subsequent zoning regulations cannot prevent
him from completing the building and conducting light m'anufacturing
therein. If his property is within an area thereafter zoned as resi-
dential he, nevertheless, is regarded as having a non-conforming use for
the purpose of conducting his business in that area. The effect of zon-
ing regulations is in the future - their operation is prospective, to
protect and preserve, not destroy."
Cf.. Dal Maso v. 'Board of County Com'r, 182 Md. 200, 206, 34 A. 2d 464
(1943) and Kahl v. Consolidated Gas & Elec. Co., 191 Md. 249, 257, 60 A.
2d 754 (1948).
1 Board of Zoning Appeals of Howard County v. M1eyer, 207 Md. 389.
supra, note 2, 294. The rule was enunciated by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in the earlier case of Amereihn v. Kotras, 194 Md. 591, 601, 71 A.
2d 865 (1950):
"If a property is used for a factory, and thereafter the neighborhood
in which it is located is zoned residential, if such regulations applied
to the factory it would cease to exist, and the zoning regulation would
have the effect of confiscating such property and destroying a vested
right therein 'of the owner. Manifestly this cannot be done, because it
would amount to a confiscation of the property, and non-conforming use
is a vested right and entitled to constitutional protection."
7 See Schiff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 207 Md. 365, 368, 114 A. 2d
644 (1955).
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one of the primary zoning problems today is the elimina-
tion of non-conforming uses.
The only positive method of eliminating non-conform-
ing uses yet devised is to amortize a non-conforming struc-
ture, that is, determine the normal useful remaining life
of the building and prohibit the owner from maintaining it
after the expiration of that time.'
Faced for the first time with a case involving amortiza-
tion provisions in a municipal zoning ordinance, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held in Grant v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore that the non-conforming use could
be eliminated by the five-year amortization method pro-
vided for in the Baltimore City zoning ordinance and that
such a provision was reasonable and constitutional.' Grant
involved an action by several signboard companies and
owners of property leased for billboard use to restrain the
Mayor and City Council and the Baltimore City Building
Inspection Engineer from enforcing a zoning ordinance
which provided for removal of billboards from residential
areas where such billboards constituted non-conforming
uses after a five-year amortization period. The appellants
argued that their rights to non-conforming uses were vested
rights of property and that the enforcement of the ordi-
nance would take these rights from them without com-
pensation, contrary to Article 3, Section 40 of the Constitu-
tion of Maryland, and so would deprive them of property
without due process of law.
In deciding against the landowners, the court stated:
".. . the earnest aim and ultimate purpose of zoning
was and is to reduce non-conformance to conformance
as speedily as possible with due regard to the legiti-
mate interests of all concerned."'10
Crolly & Norton, Termination of Non-Conforming Uses, 62 ZoNINo
BuLL. 1 (1952).
9 212 Mid. 301, 129 A. 2d 363 (1957). Cf. City ;of Los Angeles v. Gage,
127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P. 2d 34, 44 (1954), where the court stated:
"The elimination of existing uses within a reasonable time does not
amount to a taking of property nor does it necessarily restrict the use
of property so that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose. Use
of a reasonable amortization scheme provides an equitable means of
reconciliation of the conflicting interests in satisfaction of due process
requirements."
10 Id. at 307. Cf. Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y. 2d 5.53, 152 N.E. 2d
42, 45, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 598 (1958), where the court said:
"... our approach to the problem of permissible restriction on non-
conforming uses has recognized that, while the benefit accruing to the
public in terms of more complete and effective zoning does not justify
the immediate destruction of substantial businesses or structures
developed or built prior to the ordinance, the policy of zoning embraces
the concept of the ultimate elimination of non-conforming uses, and
thus the courts favor reasonable restriction of them." (Emphasis
added.)
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After finding that the use of eminent domain and the
law of nuisances were unsatisfactory methods for eliminat-
ing non-conforming uses," the court suggested:
"It has become apparent that if non-conforming uses
are to be dealt with effectively it must be under the
law of zoning, a law not limited in its controls to harm-
ful and noxious uses in the common law sense. Many
legislative bodies have come to the technique of stat-
utes or ordinances that call for the cessation of the
extraneous use after a tolerance or amortization period,
varying in length with the nature of the use and of the
structure devoted to the use, from one year to sixty
years.... It has been said that the only positive method
yet devised of eliminating non-conforming uses is to
determine the normal useful remaining ecomonic life
of the structure devoted to the use and prohibit the
owner from using it for the offending use after the
expiration of that time."12
Thus the Maryland court appears to have approved the
amortization technique for elimination of non-conforming
uses, and, at the same time, to have disapproved the use of
eminent domain and the law of nuisances in accomplishing
this end.
The court did not say, however, that every amortization
technique used will be found constitutional:
"The distinction between an ordinance that restricts
future uses and one that requires existing uses to stop
after a reasonable time, is not a difference in kind but
one of degree and, in each case, constitutionality de-
pends on overall reasonableness, on the importance of
the public gain in relation to the private loss.""
On the basis of this statement, it seems the court would
uphold the elimination of non-conforming uses by amorti-
zation but only if the statute is reasonable and the benefit
"Id. at 308, 129 A. 2d at 365:
"The effectiveness of eminent domain is restricted by the necessity
that the purchase must be for a public use, by the complexities of
administrative procedures and by the high cost of reimbursing the
property owners. The law of nuisances has limits that many times
make its use fall short of the objective. Some courts will restrain
only common law nuisances and even where the lawmakers have ex-
panded the nuisance category, judicial enforcement seems often to have
been restricted to uses that cause a material and tangible interference
with the property or personal well-being of others, uses that are
equivalent to or are likely to become common law traditional nuisances."
"Id. at 308, 309.
"Id. at 315.
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to the public outweighs the loss to the individual property
owners.
In the Grant case, the Court of Appeals was guided by
two fairly recent California decisions. The first of these
was Livingston Rock and Gravel Company v. County of Los
Angeles. 4 There the zoning board for the County of Los
Angeles denied the right of a cement company to continue
a non-conforming use after a twenty-year amortization
period. The company was established in a zone of unlimited
uses. The area was rezoned to include only light manufac-
turing and the cement mixing company became a non-
conforming use. The court upheld the Zoning Board's
action against constitutional attack:
"[Zioning legislation looks to the future in regulating
district development and the eventual liquidation of
non-conforming uses within a prescribed period com-
mensurate with the investment involved."'"
The more recent California case, frequently quoted with
approval by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Grant, is
City of Los Angeles v. Gage.'6 In 1930, Gage acquired two
adjoining lots. He constructed a two-family residential
building on one lot and rented the upper half solely for
residential purposes. The lower half of the building was
used for his plumbing supply business. In 1946, the City
Council of Los Angeles passed an ordinance, applicable to
the defendant's lot, providing that:
"The non-conforming use of a conforming building or
structure may be continued, except that in the 'R' Zones
[residential zones] any non-conforming commercial or
industrial use of a residential building or residential
accessory building shall be discontinued within five (5)
years from June 1, 1946, or five (5) years from the date
the use becomes non-conforming, whichever date is
later.1' 7
In 1946 the City Council also changed the zoning classi-
fication on the defendant's lots from commercial to resi-
dential. The City then sought to enjoin the defendant from
conducting his plumbing supply business on this property.
The defendant contended that the ordinance was arbitrary
and unreasonable, that it had no substantial relation to the
public's health, safety, morals or general welfare, and that
it was an unconstitutional impairment of his property
1 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P. 2d 4 (1954).15 Id. at 127.
16 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P. 2d 34 (1954).
17 Id. at 448.
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rights. Gage estimated that he would suffer a loss of be-
tween $125,000 and $350,000 annually, based on past gross
income, if the injunction were to be granted. In upholding
the ordinance as applied to the defendant, the court stated
that the neighborhood change was sufficient reason for
passing the ordinance 18 and added that the City Council had
the undoubted power to pass such legislation as is necessary
to effectuate its zoning. 9 In discussing amortization as a
method of eliminating non-conforming uses, the court con-
sidered the reasonableness of amortization:
"It would seem to be the logical and reasonable method
of approach to place a time limit upon the continuance
of existing non-conforming uses, commensurate with
the investment involved and based on the nature of the
use, and in cases of non-conforming structures, on their
character, age, and other relevant factors. ' '20
A more recent case is Harbison v. City of Buffalo,"
where for the first time the highest court of a state dis-
cussed the factors which should be used in determining the
reasonableness of an amortization statute. Since 1924, the
petitioners in Harbison had operated a cooperage business
(the reconditioning of steel barrels and drums) in an un-
zoned area of Buffalo. In 1926, the area was zoned for
residential use. From 1936 through 1956 petitioners applied
for and obtained a license to carry on their business under
an ordinance which included their operations under the
definitions of junk dealers. Effective July 30, 1953, the
ordinances of the City of Buffalo were amended to provide,
in effect, that premises within certain classifications, in-
cluding the petitioners' premises, must liquidate their use
within a three-year period. Accordingly, in 1956, peti-
tioners were notified to cease the operation of their business
immediately. After their license application was denied,
petitioners brought a mandamus proceeding and the trial
court granted an order directing that a wholesale junk
license be issued to the petitioners. The Appellate Division
affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals, with three
judges dissenting, reversed and remanded the case for a
final determination of the issues, holding that the constitu-
tion does not forbid termination of a prior non-conforming
use after a period long enough to allow the owner a fair
11 Id. at 453.
19 Id. at 459.
20 Ibid.
.1 4 N.Y. 2d 553, 152 N.E. 2d 42, 176 N.Y.S. 2d, 598 (1958).
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opportunity to amortize his investments and make future
plans.
Although a distinction exists between a non-conforming
use and a non-conforming structure, the rules of amortiza-
tion applying to each are analogous; the New York Court
of Appeals recognized that:
"If, therefore, a zoning ordinance provides a sufficient
period of permitted non-conformity, it may further pro-
vide that at the end of such period the use must cease.
This rule is analogous to that with respect to non-
conforming structures. '22
Unlike the decisions in Grant and Gage, however, the New
York court mentioned five factors to be considered in de-
termining the reasonableness of the statutory amortization
period:
(1) the nature of the surrounding neighborhood;
(2) the value and condition of the improvements on
the premises;
(3) the nearest area to which the owner may relocate;
(4) the cost of such relocation; and
(5) other reasonable factors and costs.
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Grant did not under-
take to create any specific standards or guidelines to deter-
mine reasonableness; in Gage, the California court took into
consideration the investment involved and the nature of
the use in discussing the reasonableness of the amortization
ordinance before it.
Harbison "left to the municipal legislatures the difficult
problem of estimating amortization periods which would
survive judicial scrutiny when applied to specific non-con-
forming uses. '23 Three years after Harbison, however, the
Intermediate Appellate Court of New York held constitu-
tional an amortization ordinance providing that non-con-
forming signs existing at the time of the adoption of the
ordinance should be removed fifteen months after its effec-
tive date,24 stating that the loss suffered by the user was
insubstantial when compared with the benefit derived by
the public. Also the Supreme Court of Kansas has upheld
legislation requiring removal of auto wrecking yards and
2 Id. at 562.
21 See 14 SYiAcusE L. Rv. 62, 63 (1962).
2 Village of Larchmont v. Thomas B. Sutton, 30 Misc. 2d 245, 217 N.Y.S.
2d 929 (1961).
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trailer storage yards in residential districts within two
years after the effective date of the resolution. 5
The federal courts also have recognized the constitu-
tionality of the amortization device. In Standard Oil Co. v.
City of Tallahassee," a divided Fifth Circuit upheld a local
zoning ordinance requiring the Standard Oil Company to
remove within ten years a non-conforming gas station situ-
ated near the Florida state capitol. The zoning ordinance's
intent was to redevelop an unsightly area around the
Florida capitol; discontinuance of the filling station was re-
quired even though the area as a whole had not yet been
redeveloped and many of the residences in the area were
far below standard.
II. LEGISLATIvE TECHNIQUES
Assuming that the Court of Appeals would uphold as
constitutional amortization provisions for the elimination
of non-conforming uses, if such provisions were fair and
reasonable and created no undue hardship on the user, it is
suggested that the Maryland legislature pass a statute
authorizing such amortization provisions as an amendment
to Maryland's present zoning statutes.27
It is also submitted, however, that determination of
periods for cessation of the non-conforming uses be left to
local governing bodies, and that no attempt be made to set
up a uniform code for the entire state, since each local
governing body will have its own peculiar problems. Such
enabling acts exist in at least four States, and follow the
same pattern in each of those states. The broadest word-
21 Spurgeon v. Board of Comrs. of Shawnee County, 181 Kans. 1008, 317
P. 2d 798 (1957). See also City of Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342
P. 2d 602 (1959), where the Court of Appeals of Washington held constilu-
tional Seattle Ordinance No. 45382 which provided : "In the First or Second
Residence Districts, any non-conforming use of premises which is not in a
building shall be discontinued within a period of one year from the date this
Ordinance shall become effective." The court stated' thlat the benefit the
public would derive far outweighed the hardship the tenant would suffer
from termination of the non-conforming use and held that this ordinance
was not discriminatory.
26183 F. 2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
21 Maryland's present zoning enabling act, 6 MD. CODE ART. 66B, § 1 (1957),
reads as follows:
"For the purpose of promoting the health, security, general welfare
'and morals of the community, the mayor and city council of Baltimore
City 'and the legislative bodies of cities and incorporated towns of the
-State containing more than 10,000 inhabitants are hereby empowered
to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of build-
ings and other structures, and percentage of lot that may be occupied,
the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of populA-
tion, and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for
trade, industry, residence, or other purposes."
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ing is found in a Virginia enabling act, providing that
"reasonable regulations may be adopted by councils of
cities and towns of the Commonwealth for the gradual
elimination of uses of land and buildings that do not con-
form to such (subsequently enacted zoning) regulations
and restrictions." 2  In Pennsylvania, 9 Oklahoma" and
Utah,"' the legislatures empowered the local authorities to
provide for the termination of non-conforming uses either
by specifying the period or periods within which they shall
be required to cease, or by providing a formula or formulae
whereby the compulsory termination of non-conforming
use shall be so fixed as to allow a reasonable period for the
recovery of amortization of the investment in the non-
conformance.
A few examples of how some localities solved their par-
ticular problems can be best illustrated by reference to
several municipal statutes. A Los Angeles" zoning ordi-
nance provides for the liquidation of non-conforming uses
in residential districts in periods of forty, thirty or twenty
years, according to the type of structure involved, the law
not to take effect for twenty years from date of passage.
Similarly, a proposed Minneapolis zoning ordinance pro-
vides a thirty year period for amortization of wood frame
buildings, forty years for wood and masonry and fifty years
for buildings, of other construction, the time period to be
figured from the date of erection of the building.3 In the
alternative, a statute can be drafted which is aimed only at
zoning out the most undesirable non-conforming uses. For
example, a zoning ordinance may provide that builders'
2"3 VA. CODE § 15-843 (1950).
2" 16 PURDON'S PENNA. STAT. ANNO. § 2033(a) (1954).
83 19 OKLA. STAT. § 863.16 (1954).
"1 UTAH STAT. § 17-27-18 (1953).
" Zoning Ordinance of Los Angeles, California § 12.23 (1951). See also
Zoning Ordinance of Portland, Oregon, § 6-2201(6) (1950), which provides
for liquidation of non-conforming uses in 60, 40, or 30 year periods accord-
ing to the type of structure involved, the law not to take effect until 15
years after the ordinance was passed, and see Chicago, Illinois, Zoning
Ordinance §§ 6.1, 6.4-8, 6.5-4, 6.6-4 (1957), which contains elaborate amorti-
zation provisions, granting grace periods of from 5 years for buildings of
less than $2,000 assessed valuation to 40 years for major buildings of "fire
resistant" construction.
"s Note, 6 WESTERN RESERvE L. REV. 183 (1955). This note also contains
the Proposed Zoning Ordinance of New York City, New York, § 870-73,
which provides that non-conforming use of land in residential or residential
retail districts must liquidate within 3 years. In residential districts signs
and buildings under $500 valuation must liquidate within 3 years. Other
buildings are given 30 years to liquidate from the time of their establish-
ment, with minimum periods of 10, 15, or 20 years before the enacted ordi-
nance will take effect (the periods vary according to the classifications of
the buildings).
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supply yards, contractors' yards or lumber yards in residen-
tial districts must be liquidated, removed or discontinued
in a three year period.34
III. CONCLUSION
Non-conforming uses can and must be eliminated. It is
suggested that the amortization scheme, by balancing the
benefit gained by the public against the loss sustained by
the individual user, is the fairest method of achieving
this goal.
Substitution Of Judgment For Mentally Incompetent
In Re duPont'
The court-appointed guardians of the estate2 of Irene
duPont, an 86 year old mental incompetent of permanent
disability, applied to the court of chancery for authority
to make certain gifts from the corpus of the ward's estate
to the ward's children and grandchildren by way of an
inter-vivos trust. Evidence was introduced to show that
the requested transfer would provide the recipients with
a substantially greater benefit, through tax savings,3 than
if the assets were to pass under the ward's will and that
the incompetent, if sane, would have recognized the tax
advantages and made such a distribution. The issue facing
the court was whether the chancery court had the power
to authorize the guardians to execute an inter-vivos trust
on the basis of the probable wishes of the ward. The
court, in granting the guardian's application, found that
the broad scope of the Delaware Statute, conferring the
jurisdiction of the chancery court4 and the power of the
14 Zoning Ordinance of Cortlandt, New York, § 9 (1951). See also Zoning
Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, § 58-18 (1946), which provides that
signs and billboards must be liquidated within 5 years, and Ordinance No.
711 (1953), Shawnee County Zoning Plan (Kansas), which provides that
auto wrecking yards and the storing or locating of trailers are non-conform-
ing uses in residential districts and are to be removed within 2 years from
the effective date of the resolution.
I ... Del. Ch ... , 194 A. 2d 309 (1963).
2 The pronounced value of the estate was $176,000,000 which produced a
gross cash income of $5,800,000 and an after-tax annual income of $800,000.
The family would be benefited by a savings of approximately $16,100,000.
"12 DEL. CODE § 3914(d) (1962) provides: "In all matters relating to the
appointment, qualification, duties, powers, liability to account, and dis-
tribution of property at the recovery or death of the ward, such guardian
shall be governed by all of the applicable provisions of law and rules of
Court relating to the management of the estates of mentally ill persons."
12 DEL. CODE § 3701 (1962) provides: "The Court of Chancery shall have
332
